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his article briefly compares for developed and
developing countries the effects of two of the
main reforms implemented in the telecoms sector dur-
ing the 1990s: the introduction of an “independent”
regulator and the opening to private capital in fixed
lines operations. It draws on new econometric evi-
dence, which is, however not explicitly reported here.1
The main “macro” reforms in telecom
The typical telecoms operator before the 1990s was
a monopolistic state-owned company. This monop-
oly was often self-regulated or regulated by the gov-
ernment rather than by an independent agency.The
regulation was generally not service oriented, e.g.
prices were often intended to generate fiscal revenue
with some concern for equity through complex
cross-subsidy schemes.
This changed with the major technological improve-
ments of the 1990s.Besides the unbundling of the sec-
tor into its various business lines (e.g.fixed vs.mobile;
local vs. long distance), most countries opened to pri-
vate telephony and the competition it allowed.
Because there is no reliable measure of the degree of
competition for a large sample of countries2, the exis-
tence of private capital investment in fixed telephony
is used here to approximate the commitment to
increased competition. It is clearly not perfect since
the opening to private sector participation (PSP) is
necessary but not sufficient to increase competition –
supporting legislation such as access rules matter as
well. According to the data from the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) on whether a
country has at least some private ownership in their
telephone companies, the share of countries with pri-
vate capital in fixed telephone lines operators
increased from 9 to 53 percent in developing coun-
tries and from 17 to 82 percent in developed countries
between 1990 and 2003, as shown in Table 1.3
The regulatory environment has also changed signifi-
cantly. One of the most directly observable reforms
may be the establishment of an independent regula-
tory agency (IRA) for telecommunications. This is a
strong public signal of the commitment to end self-
regulation and to emphasize economic concerns in
regulation.4 This choice to proxy for the commitment
to reform the regulation system allows for a simple
classification of countries into those that have an IRA
and those that do not.The existence of IRAs is being
monitored and documented by ITU as well. 5 Table 1
shows that the share of countries with an IRA
increased from 5 to 65 percent in developed countries
and from 12 to 57 percent in developing countries.
Table 1 also shows that among developing countries
there are more countries with IRAs than countries
with private involvement in the local loop in 2003
while the opposite is true for developed countries.
This implies that a country does not need a regulator
to attract private operators and a regulator does not
guarantee that the government will be open to PSP
in its local loop.The table also shows that the intro-
duction of PSP and IRA was, on average, simultane-
ous in developed countries (in 1997); while in devel-
oping countries, the introduction of PSP briefly pre-
ceded the creation of IRAs.
Telecom performance and its dimensions
To account for multiple performance dimensions,we
have selected six ITU indicators. The proxy for
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access is the number of telephone subscribers. The
proxies for affordability are the price of a 3-minute
local phone call and the monthly subscription fee
(for residents and for business).The proxy for quali-
ty is the number of reported telephone faults per
100 mainlines; and the proxy for productivity is the
number of telephone mainlines per employee.
These indicators are the best available in terms of
coverage but they are far from perfect. Regarding
access, Wallsten (2001) argues that the number of
subscribers may over or understate access because it
does not differentiate multiple lines per person with
multiple persons per line. Regarding affordability,
the information does not account for many of the
“informal”alternatives available to phone users (e.g.
calling cards), or for  pricing in the mobile segment.
Finally, our proxy for quality may be misleading in
two ways.First,reporting faults might depend on the
rules, regulations and dynamic of the sector in the
country. Second, reforms may result in improvement
in reporting systems, which could record a larger
number of the faults missed earlier.
Table 2 summarizes the basic statistics for these indi-
cators. As expected, there are pronounced differ-
ences in the access rate between developed and
developing countries, with the former displaying an
average access rate approximately 6 times higher.
Local phone call normalized to GDP per capita was
about 30 times higher in developing countries than
in developed ones, while the annual cost of a resi-
dential or business line (normalized in the same
way) was about 14 times larger in developing coun-
Table 1 
Evolution of reform implementation from 1990 to 2003
% of sample Sample size
Developing Developed Developing Developed Total
Privatisation/competition
Number of countries with PSP as of 1990 9% 17% 129 35 164
Number of countries with PSP as of 2003 53% 82% 129 34 163
 Average  year of privatisation* 1997 1997 57 23 80
Regulation
Number of countries with IRA as of 1990 5% 12% 153 51 204
Number of countries with IRA as of 2003 65% 57% 153 51 204
Average year of establishment of IRA* 1998 1997 93 23 116
*Average among countries that reformed between 1991 and 2003.
  Source: Own calculations using ITU data.
Table 2 
Average performance 1990–2003 
Means Number of observations
Developing Developed Developing Developed Total






2,073 647 2,720 






1,570 446 2,016 






1,650 461 2,111 






1,623 453 2,076 






1,094 328 1,422 




1,787 600 2,387 
Source: Own calculations using ITU data. Countries were classified in developing and developed according to their 2001
GNI per capita. Standarddeviations inparenthesis.tries than in developed countries.As measured here,
quality seems to be remarkably worse in developing
countries, with an average failure rate of 73 percent,
compared to 19 percent in developed countries.
Labour productivity is (on average) 2.5 times higher
in developed than in developing countries.However,
for both country groups, the expected correlation
between productivity and reform policies is positive.
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Table 3 
Performance vs. reform in 2003 – averages for different country groups
Mean
(standard deviation, number of observations) 










Telephone subscribers/1000 people in…
 Developing  181  191  226  412  290 
 (158.16) (214.30) (205.10) (367.46) (300.115)
Developed 960 1049  1171  1360  1277 
 (272.2)  (378.2)  (254.5)  (175.20) (276.36)
 All countries 268  245  541  700  526 
 (300.18) (303.32) (508.15) (543.66) (514.151)
Price of local phone call in…
 Developing 87  95  58  60  75 
 (138.9)  (147.21) (68.4) (97.37)  (114.84)
 Developed 0  6  0.9  6  5 
 (na.1) (na.1) (1.2)  (3.12) (5.20)
 All countries 78  91  39  47  62 
 (133.10) (145.22) (60.6) (87.49) (106.104)
Annual residential subscription fee in…
 Developing 630  464  253  392  499 
 (577.10) (364.19) (212.3)  (410.38) (533.84)
 Developed 57  99  91  83  79 
 (na.1) (na.1) (65.2) (32.14) (32.22)
 All countries 578  446  188  309  412 
 (574.11) (363.20) (177.5)  (376.52) (504.106) 
Annual business subscription fee in…
 Developing 830  650  438  629  759 
 (706.10) (533.19) (310.3)  (633.37) (726.83)
 Developed 132  99  134  94  97 
 (na.1) (na.1) (95.2) (32.12) (41.20)
 All countries 767  623  316  498  630 
 (703.11) (534.20) (279.5)  (596.49) (702.103) 
Phone faults in…
 Developing 64  26  53  27  38 
 (47.6) (32.10) (na.1) (25.16) (39.39)
 Developed 4  –  23  21  17 
 (na.1) –  (na.1) (30.9) (23.16)
 All countries 55  26  38  24  32 
 (49.7) (32.10) (21.2) (26.25) (36.55)
Mainlines per employee in…
 Developing 66  107  110  108  98 
 (31.10) (87.9) (66.3) (63.16) (70.43)
 Developed –  146  441  192  215 
 – (43.2) (120.2)  (50.10)  (96.19) 
 All countries 66  114  242  141  134 
 (31.10)  (80.11)  (197.5)  (71.26)  (95.62) 
Notes: Coverage for 2003 is not as goodas that for previous years. Thus, for some groups samples are too small to draw
significant conclusions. 
na.1 means not applicable. Used when there is only one observation in the group, which makes impossible to calculate
the standarddeviation.
IRA refers to independent regulatory agency, and PSP refers to the existence of private capital.
The price of a 3-min local call is expressedin 2000 US cents/10,000 GDP pc; while annual subscription fees are 
expressedin 2000 US dollars/10,000 GDP pc.
Phone faults correspond to reported faults per 100 mainlines.
Source: Own calculations using ITU data. Countries were classified indeveloping anddeveloped according to their
2001 GNI per capita.CESifo DICE Report 3/2006 19
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Table 3 also reports basic statistics but compares
countries that have committed to reforms with
those that have not as of 2003. The sample in the
first column includes countries that have not
reformed, in the sense that they neither have an
IRA, nor any private ownership.The sample in the
second column includes countries that have an
IRA, but in which firms are state-owned.The third
column presents countries with private capital but
without a regulator.Together,columns 2 and 3 refer
to those countries that have implemented some
reform policies. Finally, the fourth column includes
countries that have committed the most to reforms,
as they have both an IRA and at least some private
capital.
The big picture that emerges from this very basic
data analysis seems to confirm some of the expecta-
tions about reforms, but it also hints at some unex-
pected correlations. In general, countries with pri-
vate capital and independent regulators have better
performance indicators.6 In other words, the basic
data analysis tells us that countries with private cap-
ital and an IRA have, on average, more subscribers,
lower price of local call, lower fixed costs, lower
faults, and higher labour productivity than countries
without private capital and IRA (compare columns
1 and 4 for all countries).
Additionally, this basic analysis reveals significant
differences on the correlation between perfor-
mance and reform policies between developed and
developing countries. Regarding access, the gap
between reformers and non-reformers (absolute
difference between column (4) and column (1)) is
bigger in developed countries than in developing
ones.This already hints at the need to look into the
relevance of other factors such as governance,
which may work differently in developed and
developing countries.
Regarding affordability and quality, developing
countries that have committed to reforms in some
way (PSP, IRA or both) enjoy better performance
than those without these reforms. An exception is
observed in the price of a local call, where an IRA is
correlated with an increase the price. These conclu-
sions cannot be validated for developed countries
mainly because some samples are too small to draw
any conclusions. However, reforms in developed
countries seem to bring about lower business sub-
scription fees. Moreover, PSP improves labour pro-
ductivity (while an IRA is on average correlated
with lower productivity). Note that some developed
countries that have not reformed seem to be doing
better than the reformers, at least in terms of the
price of a local call and of quality.
Empirical evidence on the impact of telecom
reforms
The reliance on simple indicators of reforms tends
to suggest that privatisation combined with other
reforms has more benefits in terms of performance
than having privatisation alone. For example,
Wallsten (2001) explores these effects for 30 Latin
American and African countries in the period
1984–97 and finds that privatisation has more ben-
efits if it is combined with the existence of a sepa-
rate regulator. Fink et al. (2001) confirm this with
respect to Asian countries in 1985–99.With a larger
sample of countries (86 developing countries dur-
ing the same period), Fink et al. (2002) show that
complete liberalisation has a positive effect on
mainlines penetration and mainlines per employee;
that both privatisation and competition improve
performance; and that the later reinforces the for-
mer.They also conclude that the sequence matters.
Finally, using panel data for 200 countries from
1985–99, Wallsten (2003) finds that establishing an
IRA before privatisation improves telecom invest-
ment and penetration.
Assessments focusing on more detailed indicators of
reforms draw very similar conclusions. D’Souza and
Megginson (1999) model firm based exclusivity peri-
ods for 85 companies in 28 countries (to capture
more information on competition) and find that it is
correlated with capital expenditures in telecoms. Li
and Xu (2004) use variables like the share of private
capital, the existence of exclusivity periods, and the
procedure of privatisation. The privatisation sample
includes 166 countries during 1981–98 and the com-
petition sample includes 42 countries during
1990–98. They find that privatisation and competi-
tion positively affect performance and that if they
work together the gains are bigger; also, that exclu-
sivity periods reduce the gains from privatisation.
Wallsten (2004) uses data on 32 privatized telecom
firms representing 28 countries and finds that exclu-
sivity periods are associated with significant decreas-
es in the incumbent’s investment in telecom network
6 It is important to keep in mind that this is a statement about cor-
relation, not about causality.and in the number of payphones,mobile subscribers,
and international outgoing minutes.
A final issue to be considered is double causality
between reforms and performance. Gual and Trillas
(2004) takes this into account by first estimating two
policy indexes (one for openness and one for the
existence of an IRA) and then analyzing their
impact on performance. They find that pro-entry
policies and the creation of an independence agency
have positive effects on network penetration and
negative effects on productivity. However, after
accounting for endogeneity, results are not very
robust statistically.
Even though there is “political” and conceptual con-
sensus about the importance of institutions and gov-
ernance for sector performance, a very limited num-
ber of studies have included such variables in the
analysis.Only Wallsten (2001) includes a governance
control – i.e. the expropriation risk. More recently,
Gutiérrez (2003) used a governance index as an
explanatory variable to analyze the effects of tele-
com reforms on performance in 22 Latin American
countries during the period 1980–97. However, the
components of his governance index refer more to
particular characteristics of reform policies in the
sector than to governance structures per se.He finds
that regulatory procedures influence network expan-
sion and efficiency.
Including governance in the picture is precisely the
value added of our empirical work.Our econometric
analysis explicitly accounts for the interactions
between governance (corruption and investment
risk) and reform policies (introduction of private
capital and establishment of an IRA) when analyz-
ing performance.7We used an unbalanced panel data
for 204 developing and developed countries during
the period 1990–2003.
We find that countries with PSP have more sub-
scribers, lower local call price, lower faults, and high-
er labour productivity. However, PSP is actually
associated with an increase in residential and busi-
ness subscription fees, which is consistent with the
tariff rebalancing that typically takes place when
ending direct subsidies as part of most reforms. We
also find that countries with an IRA have lower local
call price, higher labour productivity and more tele-
phone faults; but the regulator does not have a sta-
tistically significant effect on the number of sub-
scribers and fixed costs.
Regarding governance, we find that corruption has,
on average, statistically significant beneficial effects
on performance in terms of access and labour pro-
ductivity in countries that have not reformed.
However, in countries that have reformed, reform
policies offset the beneficial impact of corruption on
performance. Overall, the main result is that even
though corruption may lead to some performance
improvements in the presence of red tape and resis-
tance to change, reform policies would lead to
stronger and better performance outputs in a much
more ethical way.
Finally, while these results are important for policy-
makers, they also hint at complex issues and trade-
offs that deserve a much more refined analysis.
Possible extensions to the econometric work include
a better assessment of reform processes and
sequences as well as a much less simple modelling of
the degree of reforms from a cross-country perspec-
tive. At the more technical level, it would be inter-
esting to generate good instruments to weaken the
assumption that reforms are exogenous to sector
performance.
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